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Abstract
The UK’s collective investment scheme (‘CIS’) sector is a key aspect of UK finan-
cial services. With the UK’s departure from the EU, it has also become a politically 
salient topic, with various Member States competing to lure business to their finan-
cial centres in the light of Brexit. Brexit prompts hard choices and a key question 
arising for the CIS industry is whether the UK should continue to shadow EU law 
or whether elements of regulatory divergence could be envisaged. The paper sug-
gests that, over the short to medium term, the UK should ensure it is likely to be 
deemed equivalent under EU law. Be that as it may, the paper also suggests that 
there may be areas within UK CIS regulation where some limited divergence can be 
considered. This would be provided that the UK remains in line with international 
standards, and (ideally) continues to be recognisably similar to remain equivalent. 
This certainly holds true in the event that equivalence is interpreted as more of a 
holistic assessment that could extend to embrace an element of regulatory competi-
tion. Any such divergence could also be framed as being of an optional nature, in 
order to grant CIS businesses full flexibility with respect to which regime they wish 
to comply. Writ large, Brexit may also help to stimulate broader conversations about 
the longer-term challenges the CIS industry faces in today’s world. Viewed in this 
light, leaving the union could also inspire innovative and proportionate solutions to 
support and strengthen this pivotal sector.
Keywords Financial regulation · Fund regulation · Brexit · EU law
1 Introduction
The UK’s collective investment scheme (‘CIS’) sector is a key aspect of UK finan-
cial services. With the UK’s forthcoming departure from the EU, it has also become 
a politically salient topic, with various Member States competing to lure business to 
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their financial centres in the light of ‘Brexit’.1 Brexit prompts hard choices and a key 
question arising for the CIS industry is whether the UK should continue to shadow 
EU law or whether elements of regulatory divergence could be envisaged.2 With a 
view to a greater understanding of the nuance contained within this issue, this paper 
considers the case study of the UK’s CIS sector, which is of considerable signifi-
cance to the UK’s economy.3 Asset management firms invest and manage large sums 
of money for investors (ranging from individuals to institutions and governments); 
they invest in a broad range of UK and international enterprises, and make finan-
cial decisions that will affect their clients’ financial wellbeing. Asset managers offer 
expertise, asset diversification, and economies of scale which investors would not be 
able to obtain investing individually, resulting in lower transaction costs.4 The City 
of London has long specialised in asset management,5 and an abundance of reports 
quantify its importance to the UK. The sector serves a global client base; it is the 
second largest in the world after the US; and it is the largest in Europe.6 It supports 
an estimated 100,000 jobs in the UK, and is a key driver of funding for the UK’s 
economy.7
With respect to CIS regulation, there are a number of core issues and challenges 
facing the industry, which are by no means limited to those posed by Brexit. Finan-
cial regulation is a highly dynamic area and strong forces exist which can drive 
change with respect to its regulation, from the international to the local. For exam-
ple, the importance of the CIS sector, and more generally of market-based finance 
(non-banking-based finance), has significantly increased since the global crisis when 
this acted as a substitute for bank lending. This is now to the extent that the sec-
tor’s concentration has increasingly drawn the attention of global regulators with 
respect to potential financial stability concerns.8 At the EU level, the industry is an 
important funding driver behind the Commission’s Capital Markets Union (‘CMU’) 
project (which seeks to create an internal capital market and immerse market-based 
finance in the EU, whilst reducing reliance on bank lending).9 At the domestic 
level, the CIS market is also on the UK’s regulator’s radar, including with respect 
to agency problems investors can face in relation to CIS managers. This has culmi-
nated in new provisions aiming to restore savers’ trust in the industry, improving 
competition, as well as plans geared at improving the information being disclosed by 
1 See e.g. Walker (2018a); Latham (2018).
2 Armstrong (2018), p 1099.
3 European Parliament (2016); The Investment Association (2017).
4 EFAMA (2017), Section 2.
5 Such businesses tend to concentrate in financial centres to facilitate access to world-class pools of tal-
ent and capital, as well as availability of financial infrastructures, Lannoo (2017).
6 European Parliament (2016). For instance, in 2017, it managed £7.7 trillion of assets, with over £3 tril-
lion managed on behalf of overseas clients, The Investment Association (2018a).
7 The Investment Association (2018a); Ernst and Young (2017).
8 See e.g. International Organisation of Securities Commissions (2018). Prudential regulators are also 
taking an interest, FSB (2017).
9 See European Commission (2015, 2017a).
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managers.10 Accordingly issues surrounding CIS regulation are not simply Brexit-
facing, although Brexit offers a valuable case study as to how this topic can generate 
serious problems, but also produce new thinking.11
It is axiomatic that Brexit creates uncertainties and difficult choices for the indus-
try. Most prominently, by the UK being an EU Member State, financial services 
firms authorised in the UK can easily provide services across the EU without the 
need for further local authorisations (often referred to as ‘passporting’).12 Passport-
ing is based on the assumption that EU-authorised firms will all have met the same 
standards and should be treated as if they were locally authorised. In the CIS sphere, 
such rights have enabled authorised CIS firms to easily market funds into and within 
other Member States, and the UK being part of the EU has granted it access to the 
world’s largest single market. EU membership has also enabled UK firms to set up, 
manage and market CISs in a variety of forms, including on a cross border basis.13 
It has shaped the way fund managers conduct their business; for instance, enabling 
firms to establish a management presence in the UK, domiciling their funds in 
another Member State (often Luxembourg), distributing the fund across the EU or 
internationally, and delegating the day-to-day investment management back to the 
UK.14
On the working assumption that the UK will lose its passporting rights on leav-
ing the EU, it will no longer benefit from the current access rights conferred via EU 
law. This is an issue of acute concern, especially given the cross-border nature of 
the CIS management sector and the vital importance of the passport to the indus-
try.15 Rather, the UK will be classified as a ‘third country’ under EU law, and will 
be required to utilise the EU’s ‘equivalence’ system in order to seek future access. 
In general terms, equivalence is a concept used by the EU to determine whether a 
third country’s regulatory and supervisory regime is sufficiently similar to that of 
the EU’s for access rights to be available.16 At the same time, there are clear disad-
vantages to relying on this set up. Only some EU financial services legislation pro-
vide for an equivalence regime (and as discussed further in Sect. 2 below, the CIS 
regime only has limited third country rules); the EU-decision process with respect to 
10 FCA (2017, 2018a); ‘FCA Reveals Strict New Rules for Asset Managers’, Financial Times, 5 April 
2018; FCA (2018b).
11 Note that individual (or discretionary) asset management as covered under MiFID II/MiFIR has devel-
oped separately under the EU regime and is excluded from this analysis, see Moloney (2017a).
12 House of Lords European Union Committee (2016), chapter 2.
13 E.g. at the end of 2016, 244 asset management firms out of the 1840 authorised in the UK had an 
outbound passport under the CIS regimes enabling them to do business in other Member States; and 139 
firms had inbound passports enabling them to sell financial services into the UK, see ibid., pp 11–12; 
Europe Economics (2016).
14 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2018).
15 See Armour (2017) who states ‘the potential loss of this ability to passport services throughout the 
EU is at the centre of the financial sector’s concerns over Brexit’; see also House of Commons European 
Scrutiny Commitee (2018), Section 3.
16 Wei (2007). See also Sect. 2 below.
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granting access rights can be complex and slow; and such decisions can be unilater-
ally revoked by the Commission on relatively short notice.17
Accordingly, Brexit will introduce additional layers of legal complexity and costs 
for the UK CIS industry, and there are no guarantees with respect to future mar-
ket access rights. At the same, however, markets and financial regulation are used 
to change; they constantly co-evolve. In this regard, Brexit need not necessarily be 
destructive for the UK, and there can be opportunities in terms of its CIS regulation. 
The broader context is also significant; in the arena of European financial services 
legislation, the UK has often played a valuable role in influencing the direction of 
travel of EU rules.18 During its membership of the EU, the UK has been known as a 
type of ‘market making’ economy, focused on ensuring the openness of London and 
the EU to international markets. It has often served as a counter-point to the more 
prescriptive, rule based and public authority orientated ‘market-shaping’ economies 
such as France and Germany, which can run the risk of veering into veiled protec-
tionism.19 The UK’s interests and drivers are significant and they will continue to 
shape how the UK makes choices with respect to regulatory design in the future. 
Connected to this, the UK also has important policy choices to make on whether 
and to what extent EU CISs and managers can continue to access the UK’s markets 
either unilaterally or in exchange for UK access.20 A UK approach focused on open-
ness to the EU’s CIS system would be in its interest in maintaining London’s reputa-
tion as a global financial centre.21
The paper suggests that, over the short to medium term, the UK should ensure 
it is likely to be deemed equivalent under EU law. This will enable existing access 
arrangements to continue as far as possible, and mean the UK’s CIS sector can mar-
ket and manage funds at least to some extent within the EU. Be that as it may, the 
paper also suggests that there may be areas within UK CIS regulation where some 
limited divergence can be considered. This would be provided that the UK remains 
in line with international standards, and (ideally) continues to be recognisably simi-
lar to remain equivalent. This certainly holds true in the event that equivalence is 
interpreted as more of a holistic assessment that could extend to embrace an element 
of regulatory competition. The paper draws specifically on the example of recent 
EU proposals within the CIS sector to demonstrate that, in the event that such ini-
tiatives severely impeded upon the operations of the UK fund sector, the UK could 
embark upon the path of limited divergence, and inject a targeted element of regula-
tory competition into the equation. Any such divergence could also be framed as 
being of an optional nature, in order to grant CIS businesses full flexibility with 
17 Ringe (2017). Moreover subsequent changes to the EU’s regulatory framework post-Brexit will also 
be of major consequence to the UK, given the size of the CIS market. In particular, the UK as a ‘rule 
taker’ will not be in a position to influence and shape the nature of any such changes at the negotiating 
table.
18 See e.g. Ferran (2004).
19 See Quaglia (2011).
20 AIMA (2018), p 5.
21 Ibid.; Armour (2017).
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respect to which regime they wish to comply.22 Writ large, Brexit may also help to 
stimulate broader conversations about the longer-term challenges the CIS industry 
faces in today’s world. ‘Fintech’ technologies are likely to transform the industry 
and create significant new challenges for it.23 Viewed in this light, leaving the Union 
could also inspire innovative and proportionate solutions to support and strengthen 
this pivotal sector.
This paper’s inquiry is a legal one, yet as this area exists at the confluence of 
law, politics, and international financial relations, the analysis is also informed by 
insights stemming from the EU financial governance scholarship, and the political 
economy literature on financial market governance. Section  2 examines the exist-
ing EU CIS framework, with particular reference to the regime in place for third 
country funds and fund managers. Section 3 considers the political economy con-
text behind the EU fund manager framework, including the Brexit factor. Section 4 
analyses three key pressure points for the UK; the EU’s third country access regime; 
the likely scope for future delegation arrangements in order to facilitate EU mar-
ket access; and the current CIS proposals on pre-marketing practices. Section 5 dis-
cusses the future for the UK’s regulatory system and how the UK could approach its 
regulation of its domestic fund industry. Section 6 concludes.
2  EU Collective Fund Regulation and Brexit
2.1  CIS Regulation: The End of Passporting
There are two main strands of EU CIS regulation: first, the EU retail funds regime 
(the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities framework, 
also referred to as the ‘UCITS’).24 Such funds are marketed predominately at con-
sumers; they pool and invest investor funds in accordance with a defined investment 
policy. The second strand is the (broadly) non-retail EU alternative fund managers’ 
directive (also referred to as the ‘AIFMD’).25 This concerns funds (such as hedge 
funds) that use alternative strategies (including via leverage) to try and amplify 
returns for investors.26 The AIFMD particularly focuses on the regulation of manag-
ers of alternative investment schemes, rather than the alternative funds themselves 
(which, by in large, target professional investors).27
These EU regimes are now well established, the CIS industry has adapted to them 
(albeit rather unwillingly with the AIFMD), and the passporting rights connected 
22 Ferran (2017), pp 62–63.
23 Ernst and Young (2017).
24 Directive 2009/65/EC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relat-
ing to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) [2009] OJ L 302/32.
25 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) 
No 1060/2009 and (EU) No. 1095/2010 [2011] OJ L 174/1.
26 European Parliament (2016).
27 Ibid. See also Moloney (2014), chapter III.
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to both regimes are crucial given the sector’s cross-border nature. As observed in 
Sect. 1, passporting enables firms authorised in one Member State to do business in 
other Member States without the need for further authorisations. It is especially as a 
consequence of these rights that CIS managers authorised in one EU jurisdiction can 
conduct regulated activities throughout the EU, set up funds in different forms, and 
manage these within a number of structures. For instance, it has enabled funds to 
concentrate in popular fund centres such as Dublin or Luxembourg whilst having a 
management base in London.28 It has also permitted non-EU managers (particularly 
from the US and Switzerland) to establish their management presence in the UK 
from which they passport into other countries. On the working assumption that the 
UK will lose its passporting rights on leaving the EU, all these rights fall away. The 
UK will no longer benefit from the current authorisations conferred via EU law and 
it will be regarded as a third country under EU law.
2.2  UK as a Third Country: Equivalence?
As identified in the paper’s introduction, equivalence is a concept used by the EU 
to manage third country access to its markets, as well as with respect to how EU 
participants interact with third country entities.29 Where applicable, it allows third 
country participants to offer services to EEA clients on the condition that the rules 
and supervisory framework of their home jurisdiction is deemed equivalent to those 
of the EU’s.30 Yet, it is an inadequate substitute for the passport. There is no over-
all third-country framework; instead this is a spectrum of different regimes, ranging 
from no to extensive provisions.31 Moreover, the Commission is generally in charge 
of third country equivalence determinations. This generates the legitimate concern 
that decisions regarding the UK could risk becoming politicised (even when tem-
pered by the role of the technocrat, the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(‘ESMA’) who often assists the Commission with making such assessments).32 Fur-
ther, although in theory it should be straightforward to assess the UK as equivalent, 
given it has implemented all EU law as a Member State, it will fall to the Commis-
sion to assess whether the UK continues to remain sufficiently aligned with EU law 
going forward.33 In this regard, the Commission also has the discretion to withdraw 
28 Europe Economics (2017). Luxembourg was the first country to implement the UCITS Directive and 
attracted a number of promoters including Switzerland and the USA. The success of jurisdictions such as 
Luxembourg in attracting investment funds may be attributed to various factors, not least its reputation 
in the industry, a known regulatory environment, and favourable tax environment (fund domicile deter-
mines its tax treatment).
29 Moloney (2017a).
30 European Commission (2017b), p 7.
31 Lannoo (2017).
32 House of Lords European Union Committee (2016), p 23.
33 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018; House of Lords European Union Committee (2016). See 
also HM Treasury, AIFMD (EU Exit) Regulations (Draft) (2018); HM Treasury, CIS (EU Exit) Regula-
tions (Draft) (2018) that seeks to ensure the EU regimes continue to operate in the event the UK leaves 
the EU without securing a transitional period.
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such decisions on fairly short notice. The Commission’s discretion to both grant and 
revoke such decisions is as an understandable quid pro quo for the fact that a third 
country authority could suddenly change its regime on a whim, nonetheless the fact 
remains that this route is a shaky basis for building a future cross-border UK/EU 
relationship.
Applied specifically to the CIS regime, the starting point is that it only has lim-
ited third country rules. This is an area where market access is not governed by any 
existing equivalence regime. The two strands of EU CIS regulation are examined 
below, and by way of introduction, for the UCITS legislation, there is no third coun-
try framework in operation. For AIFMD, access is currently based on local require-
ments within each Member State where access is sought.
2.3  The UCITS Regime: Access Options
The UCITS regime provides access to the EU’s single market for the UK retail CIS 
sector, and the UK industry values the UCITS label (it is a badge internationally 
renowned and trusted) and its style of regulation, including ensuring a high level of 
investor protection.34 As regards the UCITS market access options, such funds are 
required under EU law to be established in the EU and managed by an EU manage-
ment company.35 As witnessed above, there is no third country framework provided. 
Accordingly, for the UK CIS sector to continue directly managing and marketing 
such funds following Brexit, UCITS funds and their managers would need to re-
domicile in an EU Member State (although any UCITS funds which are offered 
solely to UK investors may chose not to do so).36 The UCITS regime does offer 
scope for there to be some delegation of operational functions to third countries, 
which suggests that there could be some continued outsourcing to the UK, but this 
is subject to compliance with the relevant legal requirements. For instance, where 
the remit concerns investment management, cooperation between the supervisory 
authorities must be ensured. Moreover, the Commission and ESMA have recently 
specified that a cooperation agreement must be in place,37 and that the use of non-
EU branches will need to be based on objective reasons linked to the services 
34 See further Moloney (2014), chapter III; Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry (2012).
35 Directive 2009/65/EC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relat-
ing to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) [2009] OJ L 302/32 (as 
Amended by Directive 2014/91), Arts. 1, 5, 6.
36 Although not the specific focus of this paper, Brexit will also affect the management and marketing 
of other EU investment funds, including the relatively new European Venture Capital Funds (EuVECA), 
the European Social Entrepreneurship Fund (EuSEF), and the European Long Term Investment Funds 
(ELTIF), which can be marketed to retail investors subject to restrictions. Currently there are very low 
levels of these funds but Commission proposals envisage ESMA as the single supervisor for this regime, 
European Commission (2017c).
37 UCITS IV, Art. 13; European Commission (2018a).
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provided in the non-EU jurisdiction.38 In essence, there must be substance to the 
entity in the home Member State.
Taken together, if a UCITS remains in the UK following Brexit, it will not be 
permitted to be marketed as a UCITS on an EU-wide basis; and EU investor access 
to investment opportunities could be blocked.39 Rather, as a matter of EU law, such 
a CIS will automatically be treated as a third country alternative investment fund 
and so it will fall within the scope of AIFMD.40 These are issues of considerable 
importance; the UCITS are popular retail investment funds (estimates point to such 
funds accounting for around 75% of all collective investments by small investors in 
Europe). Further, the alternative for UK-based managers of such funds having to 
comply with the AIFMD third country framework to market UCITS within the EU 
is a steep price to pay.41
2.4  The AIFMD Regime: Access Options
As observed above, UCITS that do not re-domicile in another Member State and 
remain in the UK after Brexit will have to seek access through the AIFMD regime. 
As a matter of EU law, such funds will be treated as a third country AIF, coming 
within the scope of the AIFMD. Accordingly the AIFMD’s third country market 
access rules become of the upmost importance on Brexit for both UK retail funds 
seeking market access to the EU, and for alternative investment funds. Once again, 
the AIFMD option is not straightforward; its third country access provisions are 
extremely cumbersome.42 There are currently two access routes to the EU under 
the AIFMD. The first is a national private placement regime for the marketing of 
a managed fund to professional investors within a Member State (but not cross-
border).43 This does not require compliance with the full scope of the AIFMD but 
it does require appropriate cooperation arrangements to be in place between the 
authority where the marketing is to take place and that of the third country.44 Mem-
ber States have the discretion as to whether to activate this regime, and the frame-
work allows for the imposition of stricter rules (so called ‘gold plating’). In practice 
some Member States have not implemented this option, and others, including Ger-
many, impose very restrictive conditions.45 In addition, each Member State decides 
38 Art. 13 of the UCITS Directive does not detail the general delegation requirements but ESMA is of 
the view that its interpretation and transposition should be consistent with the principles specified in the 
AIFMD level 2 rules, see ESMA (2017); Maijoor (2018). Note that (as discussed in Sect. 4 below) the 
Commission has also proposed reinforcing coordination via the European Supervisory Authorities in 
relation to delegation and outsourcing of activities, European Commission (2017c).
39 Moloney (2017a).
40 UCITS IV (as amended), Art. 6; Directive 2011/65/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
[2011] OJ L 174/1, Art. 6; European Commission (2018a); Moloney (2017a).
41 House of Lords European Union Committee (2016), p 18.
42 See further Ferran (2011).
43 AIFMD, Art. 42.
44 Ibid., Art. 42(1)(b).
45 Clifford Chance (2016); Ferran (2017); AIFMD, Arts. 36 and 42.
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whether it permits marketing of all alternative investment funds (whether EU or 
non-EU) to retail investors, with many Member States restricting or prohibiting such 
marketing.46
The second is a third country fund manager EU passporting route. This is sub-
ject to authorisation by a Member State, and compliance with a range of conditions 
(including full compliance with the AIFMD). This option is yet to be ‘switched on’ 
by the Commission, however (and this ‘flicking of the switch’ will then lead to a 
phasing out of the national private placement regime). ESMA has provided advice 
regarding the jurisdictions to which the passport should be extended, but in 2015 
it also called for a slow-down in approach.47 In the latest round of assessments in 
2016, only five out of 12 non-EU countries received unqualified advice (with the 
remaining seven jurisdictions, including the US and Hong Kong, receiving qualified 
advice) and a general sense of a ‘sitting on the fence’ theme.48 As already observed, 
although the UK should be able to be regarded as equivalent at the point of its depar-
ture, the state of play with respect to other jurisdictions’ assessments demonstrate 
that the process could be slow. Further, it could be, whether for political or competi-
tive reasons, or simply because the UK is last in line, that it is placed at the back of 
the queue.49 Moreover, it is also likely that sufficient maintenance of the status quo 
becomes a stipulation of this passport being made available to UK fund managers.50
Aside from these routes, the AIFMD framework does permit delegation of man-
agement activities to non-EU managers, provided certain conditions are met (includ-
ing a cooperation agreement),51 but not to the extent it can no longer be considered 
the manager of the fund.52 Indeed, as explored further in Sect. 4 below, the spectre 
of Brexit has now heralded a change in tone as to the appropriateness of existing 
delegation arrangements, suggesting this avenue is not a panacea.
Taken together, Brexit introduces extra layers of legal and political complex-
ity with respect to the UK’s CIS sector, and the future compliance with EU law 
will generate considerable additional costs for the industry. UK UCITS will have 
to redomicile, or be required to follow the alternative fund industry in abiding by 
the AIFMD’s third country access provisions. These requirements are a bitter pill to 
swallow for the industry to have future access to the EU’s markets.
46 AIFMD, Art. 43.
47 Ibid., Arts. 35, 37–41; see also ESMA (2016).
48 AIMA (2016).
49 Indeed in this regard, the ESMA’s reluctance to confer the passport on the US suggest that such issues 
could influence the timing and the willingness to extend the passport to the UK, Davis (2016).
50 Ibid.; Clifford Chance (2016). For further analysis, see also Ferran (2017).
51 AIFMD, Art. 20; Delegated Regulation 231/2013/EU OJ L 83/1 supplementing Directive 2011/61/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with Regard to Exemptions, General Operating Con-
ditions, Depositaries, Leverage, Transparency and Supervision (‘AIFMD Level 2 Regulation’), Arts. 
75–82. See also ESMA (2017).
52 See further, AIFMD Level 2 Regulation, recital 93, Art. 82.
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3  The Political Economy Context
3.1  Why the Complexity?
That the current access routes to the EU for third countries are not straightforward 
can be first explained by the fact that, historically, third country access regimes have 
often been postponed to the end of lengthy negotiations, heightening the risk of 
reaching ‘rubbish compromises’.53 Further, there can be deep-rooted political bat-
tles involved during the legislative process. In general terms, and as this section dis-
cusses, there can be clashes between more market-focused economies, such as the 
UK, that have traditionally tended to advocate policies focused on lighter-touch reg-
ulation and notions of openness (including for third country actor access); and more 
market-shaping continental economies, (which may include Germany and France) 
that may have a preference for more prescriptive and public-orientated regulation.54
The convoluted framework now in place for third countries in the AIFMD has 
been clearly documented in the political economy and cognate literature. It is perti-
nent to draw insights from this in order to comprehend the likely future access set-
up for the UK’s CIS industry. It also helps shed light on analogous political tensions 
now emerging, including with respect to the delegation regime. Indeed, such battles 
raise the question as to whether or not the EU could be likely to embrace a more 
facilitative approach to access routes for the UK CIS industry. If an accommodating 
stance does not appear likely, then this connects to a question explored in Sect. 5 as 
to how the UK should approach the future regulation of its domestic CIS industry.
3.2  The Push to Regulate Alternative CISs: The ‘Old’…
The particular move to regulate alternative investment funds at the EU level 
emerged following the global financial crisis. When the AIFMD was under negotia-
tion, the debate over the proposed AIFMD third country provisions, including the 
passport system for non-EU fund managers, was especially fractious. A more lib-
eral approach to the EU’s third country access rules was supported particularly by 
the UK, as well as the international hedge fund industry. Opposition stemmed par-
ticularly from France, a stance that may have been driven by veiled protectionism 
concerns.55 The gulf between notions of openness to the international hedge fund 
industry stemming from the UK on the one hand, and the more protectionist stance 
of continental countries on the other can be understood, first in part, by reference 
to what Quaglia terms the ‘old’ political economy of hedge fund regulation.56 This 
strand of literature suggests that institutionally shaped economic interests rooted in 
national varieties of capitalism can shape national preferences and can help explain 
53 House of Lords European Union Select Committee (2015) per comments of Sharon Bowles; Ferran 
(2017).
54 Quaglia (2015); Ferran (2017).
55 Ferran (2017); ‘France and UK Seek Hedge Fund Deal’, Financial Times, 12 March 2010.
56 See the leading analysis of Hall and Soskice (2001).
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why some jurisdictions are keen to strictly regulate the alternative investment fund 
industry while others are not.57 Put simply this draws a distinction between two 
‘ideal-types’ of political economies: liberal market economies (such as the UK); 
bank-based coordinated market economies (with Germany as the poster-boy exam-
ple); and with France tending to fall in the middle.58 On this analysis, Member 
States will seek to have EU rules in line with their national regulatory approach and 
there will be national resistance to EU provisions that could distort the domestic 
model of capitalism.59 This can help to start explain the political economic causes 
of divergence between the EU and some Member States on EU proposals over the 
years, not least the famous example of takeover liberalisation, which was supported 
by the UK but which met with opposition from continental jurisdictions.60
3.3  …and the ‘New’
At the same time, there has also been an increasing blurring of these two ideals 
over the years, not least due to market developments, and a multitude of other fac-
tors including the impact of globalisation, international capital flow, and technology. 
Linked to this, Quaglia has developed a sophisticated variation, termed the ‘new’ 
political economy of regulation. This harnesses the initial concepts in Sect.  3.2, 
but also requires reference to the belief systems or ‘policy paradigms’ of coalitions 
within the EU and how these can shape national understandings and preferences. 
Specifically, this line of scholarship suggests that EU financial regulation policy is 
shaped by reference to two competing coalitions, the northern European group led 
by the UK, and the southern Europe group, which includes France, which prioritises 
financial stability and rule-based regulation.61 On this strand of analysis, Germany 
falls somewhere in the middle.62 Although ideas are inextricably intertwined with 
national political economy interests, the influence of the market-shaping paradigm 
can help explain the shifting balance of power towards market shaping coalitions in 
the light of the global crisis, including the EU push to regulate AIFMs. Specifically 
there could be the political use of ideas by market-shaping countries in order to pro-
mote their regulatory preferences.63
Nonetheless, it is necessary to remain cautious about generalisations. For 
example, in the AIFMD negotiations, there was often far more nuance to the 
UK’s, and the other countries’ responses; with different domestic preferences also 
57 Quaglia (2011); see also Moloney (2016), Section 2.
58 As the terms suggest, market-based economies place an emphasis on competitive market arrange-
ments, market based financing, a limited role for the state and a low degree of regulation. Bank-based 
economies place greater weight on long-term relationships with banks and other long term finance as 
well as regulated labour markets.
59 Buckley and Howarth (2010); Quaglia (2010, 2011).
60 Clift (2009); Callaghan and Höpner (2005).
61 Quaglia (2010, 2011).
62 Buckley and Howarth (2010).
63 ‘A New Pecking Order’, The Economist, 7 May 2009, https ://www.econo mist.com/node/13610 767 
(accessed 13 Apr 2018); Quaglia (2011).
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varying depending on the issue under the spotlight. For instance, although there was 
a Franco-German push to regulate the hedge fund industry, the scholarship acknowl-
edges that this conceals the reality of domestic government policy. Indeed, the Ger-
man government was instrumental in opening up the market to AIFs, and France 
had the largest concentration of AIFs in the EU aside from the UK.64 Accordingly, 
the Franco-German push to regulate was more linked to ‘political legitimacy rather 
than principled disapproval of their activities’.65 Moreover, as Ferran argues, the UK 
position also had more to it than was evident on first glance; the UK sought (unsuc-
cessfully) to champion a global response to regulation of alternative investment fund 
managers. This was not least to avoid the risk of regulatory arbitrage, and to prevent 
the risk of EU markets being closed to third country fund managers and funds, par-
ticularly given the effects this could have on the international competitiveness of the 
markets.66
Certainly, in the context of the debate over the third country access rules, France 
perceived the proposed third country regime as a means of ensuring financial sta-
bility and regulatory alignment of third country rules with those of the EU’s.67 A 
French-led coalition, supported by many in the European Parliament (the ‘Parlia-
ment’), pursued restrictive rules in order to ‘prevent Europe becoming the Trojan 
horse’ for alternative investment funds.68 Something tantamount to a small soap 
opera then unfolded with the US administration intervening via letters leaked to the 
press to the effect that these proposals required watering down, with hints that EU 
fund managers could otherwise face reprisals in Congress.69 The end result was the 
ultimate tempering of the most controversial proposals and with the Commission 
strategically reframing the rules as neither protectionist nor liberalising, all helping 
to explain the convoluted nature of the final set of third country rules.70
3.4  Political Economy Battles and Brexit
The preceding analysis provides valuable explanatory power with respect to the bat-
tles now playing out over CIS regulation in the light of Brexit. Specifically, France 
has publicly sought tighter regulation within the AIFMD; already imposes its own 
gold plating with respect to the third country regime and maintains that the existing 
equivalence framework requires reinforcing.71 Yet it also makes no secret of seek-
ing to secure a larger slice of the EU fund management pie in Paris.72 In this regard, 
64 Zimmermann (2009); Buckley and Howarth (2010).
65 Ferran (2012); Buckley and Howarth (2010); Zimmermann (2009).
66 Ferran (2012); Howarth and Quaglia (2017).
67 Quaglia (2015).
68 Howarth and Quaglia (2014); Quaglia (2015).
69 Howarth and Quaglia (2014); Geithner (2010); Politi (2010).
70 Quaglia (2015); Ferran (2017).
71 In particular France states that it has ‘long wanted stricter scrutiny of funds and more harmonisation 
of asset management rules across Europe’, ‘London’s Asset Managers Fret over Prospect of EU Raids’, 
Financial Times, 12 January 2018.
72 Howarth and Quaglia (2018); see also Latham (2018).
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political scientists reflecting on this canvas make a powerful argument (albeit cave-
ated by the on-going developments surrounding Brexit). They suggest that there is 
now greater evidence of a ‘neo-mercantilist’ battle emerging amongst the Member 
States with respect to promoting their financial hubs and competing to attract busi-
ness from the UK.73
For instance, although Germany has, in the main, been less vocal with respect 
to the issues emerging with respect to collective asset management and Brexit, the 
German regulator BaFin has also been pitching for business, and running work-
shops for asset managers considering migrating to Frankfurt. At the same time, Ger-
many can be expected to play to its comparative advantage; what it can gain from 
Brexit will depend considerably on the ‘old’ national varieties of capitalism.74 In 
the context of collective asset management, given that Germany also competes with 
other countries that already have a firm foot in the door with management compa-
nies domiciled in Luxembourg, Dublin, or Paris, this may well add further nuance 
to its position.75 Domestic politics have also been dominating in Germany; and its 
new coalition has publicly opposed wider French moves towards greater levels of 
European integration.76 Of itself, this is in line with the important point that presup-
posing a commonality of interests between France and Germany can be erroneous. 
Many competing preferences and influences will affect the domestic response across 
and within a range of matters, and these can reasonably be expected to adjust in light 
of a shifting landscape, particularly that triggered by domestic elections, or an event 
such as a Member State’s departure from the Union.
Accordingly, the political economy history provides meaningful guidance when 
applied to Brexit. It also reiterates that the UK industry may have an arduous and 
costly time ensuring access to individual Member States under the current regime. 
In this regard, this situation could also affect how the UK chooses to tackle the ques-
tion of its domestic regulatory design over the longer term.
4  UK: Key Pressure Points
4.1  UK Access to EU Markets: Third Country Status
The broader political economy context surrounding the AIFMD demonstrates that 
the UK morphing into a third country generates considerable challenges with respect 
to its future market access rights. This section examines three particular pressure 
points materialising for the UK CIS industry. Moreover, although some of this anal-
ysis is necessarily speculative given live proposals on the table, informed insights on 
these sensitive areas can be usefully drawn from current understandings of the law, 
politics, and financial regulation.
73 Howarth and Quaglia (2018).
74 Ibid.
75 Dohle (2017); Ferran (2012).
76 See e.g. Münchau (2018).
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First, as identified above, if no UK/EU agreement with equivalent access is 
agreed, the UK’s CIS industry will have to rely on the EU’s third country mecha-
nisms. This will require the UK to ensure it continues to shadow EU regulation in 
its law and supervisory arrangements sufficiently closely to be viewed as equiva-
lent for EU law purposes.77 The preceding analysis has demonstrated the many legal 
and political weaknesses that this option has with respect to providing an access 
platform to the EU.78 The CIS third country provisions are rather ‘unwieldy’79; the 
equivalence assessment process can be protracted; and the Commission can with-
draw decisions unilaterally.80 Yet, from a pragmatic perspective, the most pressing 
short-to-medium term need is for the UK to be considered equivalent on day one of 
Brexit (which will either commence following the envisaged transition period, or 
earlier if there is ‘no deal’).81 The UK being considered equivalent would avoid the 
risk of any sudden change of relationship between the UK and the EU (the risk of 
the so-called ‘cliff edge’).
Applied to the CIS sector, and starting with the AIFMD regime, as identified in 
Sect. 2, the general position is that UK CIS managers can, in principle, use the pri-
vate placement framework for seeking access to particular markets. Further, if the 
Commission subsequently decides to give the green light on switching on the third 
country passport, the ESMA will also need to make an assessment as to whether the 
passport should be extended to the UK. The mirror image issue also presents itself 
with respect to what approach the UK should take to EU funds and fund managers 
seeking to continue to market EU funds to UK investors. This reflects a point true 
more widely: the UK has its own policy decisions to make on whether and to what 
extent EU entities can continue to have any preferential status, and whether this is 
unilaterally or in exchange for UK entities continuing to enjoy a reciprocal status in 
relation to EU activities.82
With this in mind, at present, a UK AIFM can relocate and become a full scope 
EU fund manager with the accompanying cost and compliance burden, or it will be 
subject to the private placement regime in a manner similar to other third country-
based fund managers. Access will be Member State dependent, and will require a 
cooperation agreement to be in place between the relevant supervisory authorities.83 
As discussed in Sect.  2, existing Member State regimes differ very significantly 
across EU jurisdictions (Germany and France are highly restrictive; the UK, Ireland 
77 European Commission (2017b).
78 See further, Moloney (2018a, b).
79 Moloney (2017b), p 124.
80 For example the equivalence decision in relation to US clearing houses took over 3 years, see Euro-
pean Commission, Implementing Decision of 15 March 2016 on the Equivalence of the Regulatory 
Framework of the United States of America for Central Counterparties That Are Authorised and Super-
vised by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to the Requirements of the EMIR Regulation 
(2016); Ferran (2017).
81 See e.g. Blitz (2018).
82 AIMA (2018).
83 AIFMD, Art. 42, also Arts. 22-24. The fund manager will also be subject to the Directive’s disclosure 
and reporting regime.
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and Netherlands are more facilitative). Hence, how accommodating Member States 
are likely to be to UK managers, and the method and cost of compliance could vary 
dramatically. In particular, sustained access to the whole of the EU market using this 
basis alone appears very unlikely.
There is also the related timing issue that complicates this option. The AIFMD 
national private placement regime does not currently enable an entity that is not, 
at that time, a non-EU CIS manager to file the necessary paperwork. Further, in 
relation to current third country CIS managers, the administrative process has been 
estimated to take between 20 and 60 days.84 It may be that the juggling act of with-
drawing existing registrations and filing the relevant documentation can be arranged 
during the transition period (in the event this occurs); but this will be Member 
State dependent. Further, and as witnessed in the political economy scholarship in 
Sect. 4, there are certainly risks as to more onerous conditions being imposed on 
a non-EU CIS manager at a Member State’s discretion. With respect to the coop-
eration agreements, these are at the heart of many of the third country provisions in 
AIFMD (as well as more generally in current EU financial legislation). Accordingly 
the UK could, and most likely should, seek to sign cooperation agreements with 
each existing EU (and EEA) country. In this regard, adopting the current practice of 
using the agreed terms of ESMA’s model memorandum of understanding governing 
the supervisory coordination arrangements between the relevant authorities would 
appear prudent.85
It may be that the commercial quid pro quo of EU fund managers wishing to 
continue to access UK investors can help to prevent any barriers swiftly emerging 
(indeed the ESMA, EU regulators and the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority have 
now agreed multilateral memoranda of understandings to cover cooperation and 
exchange of information in the event the UK leaves without a deal).86 In this regard, 
the UK continuing to adopt a permissive stance with respect to market access would 
seem sensible.87 This could help limit the risk of possible disruption, and also send 
a positive signal in relation to setting up reciprocal flexible arrangements. More-
over, such reciprocity of treatment is likely to be a necessary condition for ESMA to 
make a positive assessment of the UK with respect to the conferral of the third coun-
try passport. On this point, the UK should seek to have ESMA perform its assess-
ment during the transition period, although the reality of this materialising may be 
unlikely given ESMA’s existing go slow policy.88 In addition, in line with Sect. 2, 
whether or not for political reasons, it could be in the Commission’s interests to send 
the UK to the back of the queue.89 Further, recent Commission proposals advocated 
84 AIMA (2018), p 7.
85 ESMA (2013); AIMA (2018).
86 FCA (2019).
87 See in this regard e.g. HM Treasury, AIFMD (EU Exit) Regulations (Draft); HM Treasury, CIS (EU 
Exit) Regulations (Draft), which take such a facilitative approach if the UK departs without a deal, 
broadly enabling EEA AIFMs and CISs to continue to market funds into the UK on the same terms as 
before.
88 See ESMA (2016); AIMA (2016).
89 Davis (2016).
 E. Howell 
123
conferring greater power on ESMA and the other European Supervisory Authori-
ties (the ‘ESAs’) to monitor equivalence decisions to ensure that the conditions for 
granting such a decision continue to be fulfilled.90 This suggests (and is further elu-
cidated on below) that the UK continuing to shadow EU law sufficiently closely may 
become a condition of any UK equivalence decision.91
In relation to the UCITS framework, the practical implications are more straight-
forward; either a UK UCITS and CIS management company re-domicile to a Mem-
ber State (in order to retain the UCITS badge), or the entities will be regarded as an 
AIF as a matter of EU law and will have to comply with the AIFMD (as discussed 
in Sect. 2.3 above). With respect to a UK UCITS only offering its shares or units to 
UK investors, such entities may choose to remain solely in the UK and the UK regu-
lator would then need to determine whether such entities will be a UK UCITS, an 
alternative investment fund, or some other yet-to-be-defined entity. Equally, there is 
the same mirror image issue as to whether EU UCITS would be permitted to market 
these funds to UK investors. Again, the UK adopting a similarly tolerant approach 
based on adequacy of the EU’s UCITS provisions would offer businesses commer-
cial certainty, and could also help bolster the strength of the UK’s case in eventually 
seeking to receive the AIFMD third country passport.92
4.2  Delegation
The fact remains that the EU’s third country access route is not a silver bullet for the 
UK CIS industry. A further major pressure point emerging for the industry concerns 
the existing CIS delegation arrangements. As observed in Sect. 2, an alternative to 
navigating the third country maze-like structure involves a UK fund manager set-
ting up a fund in a suitable Member State, most likely Luxembourg or Ireland, and 
delegating various management functions back to the UK. This enables alternative 
investment fund managers as well as UCITS management firms to delegate func-
tions to a UK manager, and many UK fund managers already operate on this basis.93 
Delegation is not derived from the EU passporting rights; rather this is an interna-
tional convention that is used fairly frequently in practice (for example, it could be 
used with respect to a CIS domiciled in an EU Member State that focuses on Asian 
shares in order to benefit from the local insights drawn from Tokyo-based manag-
ers).94 The existing model has enabled centres such as Luxembourg and Dublin to 
emerge as the domicile of choice for the CIS sector, but with delegation arrange-
ments occurring in other financial centres both within the EU (including the UK), 
but also further afield.
90 European Commission (2017c).
91 Moloney (2017c).
92 AIMA (2018).
93 Ashurt (2016). Although beyond the scope of the paper, this could also be true for individual asset 
management under MiFID II/MiFIR.
94 The Investment Association (2018b), p 9; House of Lords European Union Committee (2018), p 90.
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Nevertheless, Brexit has led to a change of tone on the appropriateness of the 
delegation arrangements. Although immersed within wider Commission initiatives, 
provisions have been proposed (that have since been contested) to place ESMA in 
the driving seat to oversee the CIS delegation arrangements. Specifically, the Com-
mission’s 2017 Proposal to Reform the European System of Financial Supervision 
(‘ESFS’) includes a new set of proposed competences with respect to the authori-
sation and supervision of non-EU actors. As identified in Sect. 4.1, it envisages a 
greater role for ESMA in equivalence decisions. It also places ESMA in a key posi-
tion to oversee the CIS delegation mechanisms where this involves delegation to 
a third country, and to ensure coordination of supervisory action (including that a 
national authority notify ESMA in advance of authorising or registering a financial 
institution where there will be a delegation of a material part of its activities to a 
third country).95 Indeed, this particular power in relation to the oversight of CIS del-
egation arrangements directly builds on an earlier ESMA Opinion with respect to 
the relocation activities following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.96
The 2017 Proposal seeks to address concerns emerging as to varying supervisory 
practices throughout the EU leading to a race to the bottom. It also tackles financial 
stability risks where third country supervisory authorities lack the necessary tools to 
adequately and effectively supervise key functions.97 Nonetheless it is not difficult to 
discern a Brexit angle to it. At its core is an unwillingness to tolerate regulatory and 
supervisory arbitrage, and the inter-linked concern that EU firms not be token ‘let-
terbox’ entities that merely route business back to the UK. It is certainly reasonable 
to seek substance to entities in a Member State. Yet this should not come at the price 
of sacrificing current industry models that reflect the industry’s global nature, and 
which has evolved around investors’ best interests.98 This is linked to the broader 
point identified at this section’s outset: delegation is not directly linked to the EU 
passport. Rather, this fairly standard practice is rooted in a well-established inter-
national norm and underpinned by strong standards and regulatory cooperation: an 
international convention to offer investment expertise.
As predicted by the analysis in Sect. 3, the ESFS Proposals have been divisive. 
Honing in on the specifics, France supported the introduction of stricter rules on 
third country outsourcing, whereas Luxembourg and Ireland have advocated retain-
ing the current framework to preserve their own industries, and to avoid penalising 
third-country centres such as the US and Japan. In fact the US once again, stepped 
into oppose the changes.99 ESMA has since watered down some of its earlier 
95 ESMA (2017); European Commission (2017c), recital 18; Art. 31a.
96 ESMA (2017).
97 European Commission (2017c), recital 18.
98 KPMG (2017).
99 Walker (2018b). See further, House of Lords European Union Committee (2018); Binham (2018). 
Other marketing-making countries including Sweden have also voiced concern as to the impact of the 
wider Commission proposals regarding ESMA on the overall competitiveness of the EU’s financial mar-
kets, see ‘European Finance Ministers Clash over Greater ESMA Powers’, Luxembourg Times, 8 Novem-
ber 2017, https ://luxti mes.lu/archi ves/498-europ ean-finan ce-minis ters-clash -over-great er-esma-power s 
(accessed 16 Apr 2018).
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rhetoric, and suggestions were also mooted that the advance notification require-
ments on delegation could be scrapped.100 At the time of writing, the 2019 Council 
Compromise Proposal retains the advance notification requirement, however it elim-
inates the strong discourse in the recital to the Commission Proposal with respect 
to the risks being particularly ‘acute’ in relation to supervised entities delegating 
activities to third countries.101 Taken together, the delegation option may assist UK 
asset management firms to an extent, but may not be the most solid foundation on 
which to build with respect to guaranteeing future market access to the EU.102
4.3  Pre‑marketing: The 2018 Fund Proposal
The third major pressure point for the industry concerns the CIS pre-marketing 
framework. This is particularly relevant under the AIFMD, where managers are cur-
rently required to notify the local regulator, but only before marketing funds to EEA 
investors, including on a cross-border basis. Accordingly, pre-marketing can occur 
in the zone prior to this. Pre-marketing involves CIS managers approaching sophis-
ticated investors in order to test investor appetite for upcoming investment strategies 
and to discuss key terms. This can be an extremely valuable market practice for fund 
managers; many alternative investment funds offer only periodic opportunities to 
invest (in contrast to UCITS, which tend to be offered on a continuous basis). Hence 
fund managers can use pre-marketing to identify interest and to define and refine 
important terms.103
Pre-marketing is governed by the AIFMD but only to the extent that the Direc-
tive includes a wide definition of marketing. Marketing is defined as ‘any direct or 
indirect offering or placement at the initiative or on behalf of the AIFM, of units or 
shares in a fund it manages to or with investors domiciled in the EU’.104 This defini-
tion does not include reverse solicitation (where an investor approaches a fund on 
their own initiative and without any marketing).105 Other than this, no further guid-
ance is provided, meaning the actual concept has been left open to interpretation. 
In line with the political economy analysis, practices have again diverged between 
Member States as to precisely what level of pre-marketing and other promotional 
activities are permitted before a marketing notification is required to be made to the 
regulator.106 In particular, consistent with earlier observations, the UK regulator 
100 Investment and Pensions Europe (2018); Walker (2018c).
101 ECOFIN (2019a), eliminating recital 18. More generally, the Compromise Proposal also tempers 
some of the Commission’s grand designs with respect to the ESFS reforms. Political agreement between 
the Council and Parliament on the Proposals was reached in March 2019.
102 Moloney (2018a), p 179.
103 European Commission (2018b). Note that, as observed in Sect.  2, any marketing of such funds to 
retail investors is subject to Member State control, and can be subject to additional regulation at the 
national level, see AIFMD, recital 71, Art. 43.
104 AIFMD, Art. 4(1)(x).
105 Ibid., recital 70 provides that AIFMD should not affect the current situation whereby a professional 
investor may invest in AIFs on its own initiative.
106 Ibid., Art. 4, Arts. 3, 32, and 42.
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currently takes a pragmatic view. It is only when the final documentation is provided 
that marketing occurs in the UK, and this liberal interpretation allows managers the 
flexibility to gauge interest, before being required to establish the fund, finalise the 
paperwork and notify the regulator.107
This is also now a topic of change, with knock-on implications for the UK. The 
Commission’s 2018 Fund Proposal introduces a harmonised definition of pre-mar-
keting to specify the conditions as to when an alternative fund manager can engage 
in such activities.108 Although it may be sensible to tackle divergent approaches that 
can result in barriers to cross-border marketing, the devil is in its detail. The Com-
mission definition narrows the concept of pre-marketing, and the conditions under 
which any pre-marketing is permitted are very restrictive. It provides that pre-mar-
keting should concern an investment idea or strategy without an actual fund having 
yet been established, and no draft offering or similar documents is permitted to be 
circulated to potential professional investors. On such a basis, this would mean that 
all documentation would effectively be required to be approved by a regulator very 
early in the process in order for a manager to be granted the marketing passport. This 
is even though such paperwork will likely be subject to further waves of negotiation 
that will then require further approval.109 Moreover, pre-marketing cannot be used to 
generate an ‘own approach’ from an investor in order to avoid the rules. Aside from 
this, however, the reverse solicitation scenario where the investor approaches a fund 
without any such (pre) marketing should not be affected.110 Yet, given that the Fund 
Proposal regards investments in relation to other similar not-yet-established funds 
of that manager as marketing, this will restrict reverse solicitation in practice.111 
Finally, in terms of scope, the proposed conditions only apply to fully authorised EU 
managers. This suggests that the extent to which non-EU managers can engage in 
such pre-marketing will remain subject to the relevant national regime.112
The approach taken by the Commission is geared more towards the restrictive 
and less pragmatic of the existing national approaches.113 Ultimately, however, the 
end result has been pared back.114 The Council’s 2019 Compromise Proposal adopts 
a more pragmatic tone with an approach more in keeping with existing CIS industry 
practice. It permits pre-marketing, including in relation to an established fund where 
a manager has not yet notified the regulator with respect to marketing (provided par-
ticular conditions are met), as well as enabling draft documentation to be circulated 
107 FCA, AIFMD Marketing, PERG 8.37.6 (Perimeter Guidance Handbook 2013); Ashurt (2018).
108 European Commission (2018c), Arts. 2 and 30a. Note the proposals also include other provisions 
including requirements aimed at harmonising UCITS and AIFMD marketing communications, European 
Commission (2018d).
109 Schnittker Möllman Partners (2018).
110 European Commission (2018c), recital 11.
111 Debevoise and Plimpton (2018).
112 European Commission (2018c), Art. 30a.
113 Ibid.; Cleary (2018).
114 In particular, the UK working with other Member States have sought to secure changes, and negotia-
tions have progressed ‘unusually swiftly’, see Glen (2018).
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to prospective investors.115 Nonetheless, strictly speaking the provisions only cover 
EU managers, meaning it remains open to Member States to apply a more restrictive 
definition to non-EU managers.116
When the various pressure points are viewed together, the implications for the 
UK seem fairly bleak. As outlined above, the EU’s third country/equivalence rules 
are a wobbly basis for future access, and will result in extra compliance costs for 
the UK’s CIS system.117 Further, in connection with the observations in Sect. 3, the 
efforts of the EU’s leading financial centres to attract UK CIS businesses consider-
ing relocation have been well documented.118 Moreover, in light of the 2017 Pro-
posals, the scope for the UK industry to rely on delegation as an access solution is 
less secure, and could be vulnerable to challenge by local regulators and ESMA.119 
Finally, although the 2018 Proposal has now been mellowed to an extent, the posi-
tion for a third country manager will remain at the discretion of the relevant Member 
State regime. Accordingly, disruption and additional costs for the industry can be 
anticipated.
5  The UK’s Future Regulatory Design
5.1  Equivalence, Divergence, or Convergence?
Section 4 illustrated a number of problematic issues for the UK’s CIS arena with 
respect to future EU access. Common to all these challenges is the posture of the 
UK on how it should tackle the subsequent regulation of its domestic CIS industry. 
Specifically, should the UK’s own regulatory design involve continued convergence 
with EU law in a post-Brexit world, or might any regulatory divergence be expected. 
Of itself, this connects to a deeper issue; as Armstrong argues, the UK/EU relation-
ship is not static, and financial regulation is highly dynamic. Accordingly there may 
be selected spaces where the UK can look to escape a direct battle with the EU 
(which it could be unlikely to win) and to develop a credible alternative response in 
order to be internationally competitive.120
As witnessed above, the UK has an extremely well established financial sector; its 
capability in the field of financial services predates its membership of the EU, and its 
115 ECOFIN (2019b) recital 11, Art. 2 (revised). The Parliament’s draft Report also sought to simplify 
the Commission conditions for pre-marketing and advocated introducing a more practical system; Euro-
pean Parliament (2018a, b). At the time of writing the legislation entered into force in August 2019, 
with Member States to apply implementing measures from 2 August 2021, see Directive 2019/1160 (EU) 
amending Directives 2009/65 and 2011/61 with regard to cross-border distribution of collective invest-
ment undertakings [2019] OJ L 188/106 (‘AIFMD 2’), Art. 4(1) and Art. 30a.
116 See AIFMD 2, recital 12.
117 Moloney (2018a), p 179.
118 See e.g. Davies and MacAskill (2017); ‘Britain Braced for Brexit Raid on £8tn Asset Management 
Industry’, Financial Times, 3 January 2018; see also Moloney (2018b).
119 Moloney (2017a).
120 Armstrong (2018).
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CIS system serves a highly international client basis.121 The UK regulators also have 
renowned expertise in the field of financial regulation. Its markets regulator sought 
to influence the EU AIFMD when it was under negotiation,122 and at the national 
level it has been recently reviewing the CIS management industry, signalling the 
importance of UK regulation with respect to this crucial sector.123 In essence, the 
UK is a key international financial centre and one that is unlikely to lose its promi-
nent position easily. As Moloney argues, there are ‘very strong network effects’ that 
attract capital to such centres, which have tried and tested infrastructures.124
With this in mind, when considering the future direction of travel for the UK’s 
CIS sector, the UK is in a strong position to consider a domestic CIS policy that 
includes elements of regulatory divergence. As this section will discuss, this could 
put its equivalence determinations at risk. Yet, at the same time, there are ways 
around this (not least if the notion of equivalence becomes more pliable). Further, 
the benefits of (focused) divergence for the UK could be great.
Unpacking the nuance, especially if the outcome of the various CIS proposals 
severely impedes the functioning of the UK’s CIS industry, it becomes conceivable 
that UK law could begin to diverge from EU law. In particular, the UK could engage 
in some targeted divergence from aspects of the AIFMD. Any such decisions could 
be clearly rationalised by drawing on the UK’s deep-rooted market-oriented inter-
ests. Indeed these manifest themselves in the UK’s existing CIS set-up, especially 
the UK’s more permissive pre-marketing practices, as well as its stance towards third 
country entities seeking access via the UK’s private placement regime. The proposi-
tion that there could be selected divergence also becomes more probable given that 
UK CIS managers are likely to be in a difficult position following their shift in status 
to third country actors. Accordingly, a UK domestic strategy framed around care-
fully considered regulatory divergence (including with respect to the parameters of 
permitted pre-marketing, and the related access arrangements) could reap important 
benefits for the UK. Writ large, such a stance could also involve the UK utilising its 
world-leading expertise in the field of fintech and applying this directly within the 
CIS industry over the longer term. Specifically, the UK is at the forefront of the fin-
tech industry, including introducing the ‘regulatory sandbox’ to support innovation 
and test new products in a highly supervised environment.125 As fintech techniques 
have the ability to transform fund management over the longer term, the UK adopt-
ing a pioneering and measured approach with respect to its domestic CIS regulation 
could ensure it is globally competitive in a post-Brexit world.
As noted, there are risks. The prospect of regulatory divergence could jeopardise 
the UK’s (still to be granted) equivalent status as far as EU law is concerned. But 
121 International Monetary Fund (2016), Appendix II.
122 See e.g. FSA (2009), Section 4, question 19; House of Lords European Union Committee (2018), 
para. 44.
123 FCA (2017).
124 Moloney (2017c), chapter 7.
125 See e.g. House of Lords European Union Committee (2018); Ernst and Young (2017). Although in 
the context of individual investment advice and the limitations of the EU MiFID regime, see e.g. Ringe 
and Ruof (2018).
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this is not necessarily a fatal defect. First, ESMA has already deemed Jersey and 
Guernsey largely equivalent for the purposes of obtaining the third country passport 
under the AIFMD regime. As Ferran argues, these jurisdictions already offer a valu-
able element of optionality into their regulatory structures to ensure maximum flex-
ibility for businesses; Jersey funds and managers can choose to be outside AIFMD, 
they can comply to the extent necessary to satisfy the national private placement 
regime, or they can opt to be fully EU compliant in anticipation of the EU third 
country passport.126 This signals that an element of regulatory optionality could be 
permissible in relation to the question of the UK being granted a favourable equiv-
alence decision.127 Moreover, a regime based on optionality could be particularly 
attractive to UK alternative investment fund managers given that many of them cur-
rently already manage non-EU funds.128
Second, it may be that the idea of equivalence becomes more accommodating. 
This feeds into the actual concept: equivalence is a term that can be subject to vary-
ing interpretation (and which can itself end up being a bargaining chip in negotia-
tions). Arguably the preferable view regards equivalence conceptually as more of a 
holistic assessment, often benchmarked against international standards, and which 
focuses on a high level of comparability, rather than a form of granular line-by-line 
examination.129 If equivalence does focus more on sufficiently similar systems and 
outcomes rather than identical forms, then this can also be seen to have some func-
tional similarities to regulatory competition. It can allow some flexibility to be built 
into encourage global competitiveness, but without a jurisdiction being granted free 
reign.130 The Commission has certainly in the past supported the idea that equiva-
lence could incorporate aspects of regulatory competition, including that the regu-
latory solution in one jurisdiction may not always work in another, and that there 
could be a ‘managed competition’ of equivalent systems based on common under-
pinnings.131 It has also acknowledged that promoting the competitiveness of the EU 
is a positive effect of an equivalence determination.132 This more malleable notion 
was also reflected, for instance, in the UK’s 2018 White Paper, which respects the 
regulatory autonomy of the UK and EU, embraces an expanded ‘enhanced equiva-
lence’ framework with an emphasis on outcomes rather than rulebooks, and articu-
lates a commitment to upholding global norms.133
This suggests that, in principle, some managed regulatory competition by the 
UK could be viable. This would be on the proviso that the UK remains within the 
bounds of international standards, including (for the alternative fund sector) the 
126 Carey (2017); Ferran (2017).
127 Ferran (2017).
128 Reynolds (2016).
129 Lehmann and Zetzsche (2018); Ferran and Ho (2014), chapter 14.
130 Wei (2007).
131 Schaub (2004); Wei (2007).
132 See European Commission (2017b), where the Commission recognises that there are positive effects 
in allowing EU market participants having access to a wider range of services and transaction choices; 
Reynolds (2017). See also the (defunct) European Council (2016), section B (competitiveness).
133 See HM Government (2018), section 1.3.4.
Post-Brexit UK Fund Regulation: Equivalence, Divergence…
123
International Organisation of Securities Commissions’ (‘IOSCO’s’) high-level prin-
ciples on hedge fund regulation. In this regard, and as analysed above, existing UK 
practice with respect to asset management is currently recognised internationally, 
and it already accords with international norms.134 Hence, viewed in such a light, 
such a strategy should not come into conflict with an equivalence determination.135
Brexit-related regulatory change should also not be so unexpected given that 
waves of regulation and de-regulation tend to follow a familiar pattern; regula-
tory oversight increases after a crisis or scandal, and then wanes as society and the 
market returns to normal (the regulatory ‘sine curve’).136 In the years that followed 
the global financial crisis, regulation and oversight over financial sector actors and 
products increased manifold around the developed world, not least in the EU, which 
applied a prescriptive, ‘more Europe’ approach to its post-crisis rulebook.137 More 
recently, however, and in line with the regulatory sine curve, deregulation is becom-
ing more of a feature, not least when one observes US policy under the Trump 
administration, but also within the EU itself with its current CMU initiative. A de-
regulatory direction of travel by the UK would continue to follow the sine curve.138 
The UK’s interests in pursuing a market-making agenda also suggest that it should 
continue to present itself as a light-touch regulation jurisdiction.
At the same time, in practice, it is unlikely that there will be any large-scale dereg-
ulation occurring at the UK level. First, such a strategy would generate considerable 
transaction costs for a legacy industry such as the UK’s CIS system. Next, UK regu-
lators have traditionally chosen not to take a minimalist stance to regulatory design, 
and in fact often bolster the UK’s laws via the gold plating of EU requirements.139 
Further, since the global financial crisis, financial governance has been shaped 
around notions of regulatory convergence, rather than competition or regulatory 
arbitrage. Hence, although there have been some calls arising for UK deregulation 
following Brexit (including politically), this paper does not advocate the Panglossian 
financial free zone or policy geared around excessive deregulation, espoused by oth-
ers, particularly given the related risks of a race to the bottom.140 The UK will have 
134 Cleary (2018).
135 See e.g. International Organisation of Securities Commissions (2009). Indeed, national regulatory 
regimes are increasingly moulded by international standards, although they do vary in terms of levels of 
granularity. See Ferran (2018). On the other hand, the EU’s uncompromising approach with respect to 
the equivalence of the requirements relating to Swiss stock exchanges looks less encouraging, see ‘EU-
Based Traders Caught in Swiss “Equivalence” Spat’, Financial Times, 30 June 2019; Moloney (2018a).
136 Coffee (2012).
137 Moloney (2010).
138 Jopson (2018); Moloney (2017c), pp 154–155; Coffee (2017), pp 14–15.
139 A good illustration in the securities and markets sector is the UK’s ‘premium’ listing option for com-
panies joining the UK’s stock markets, which raises the bar beyond that required by EU law, see further 
e.g. Clifford Chance (2014); Gullifer and Payne (2015), chapter 10. With respect to the banking sector, 
see also e.g. ‘Bank of England Needs Freedom to Set Tough Rules, Says Mark Carney’, Financial Times, 
17 July 2018, https ://www.ft.com/conte nt/95343 036-899d-11e8-b18d-01817 31a03 40 (accessed 6 Aug 
2018).
140 See e.g. Reynolds (2016); ‘Brexit Is a Golden Chance to Throw Some EU Regulations on a Bonfire’, 
The Telegraph, 28 March 2017.
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more capacity to shape regulation globally via the International Standard Setting 
Bodies if the UK and the EU remain closely connected. Certainly, both the UK and 
the EU have a common interest in a well-functioning international financial system 
that they can contribute to and seek to influence.141 This also appears to be envis-
aged in the Draft Political Declaration for the future UK/EU framework that refers to 
their close cooperation with respect to regulatory and supervisory matters.142
Rather, the paper advocates a UK domestic policy framed around strands of reg-
ulatory competition. This would occur in those carefully targeted areas where the 
UK can marshal its core strengths and develop credible alternatives or ambitious 
new approaches where an existing policy of EU harmonisation (such as the AIFMD) 
has underperformed and created difficulties for market sectors.143 Drawing on the 
paper’s observations, the proposed Brexit-related regulatory autonomy in relation to 
the AIFMD would apply to the UK’s permitted pre-marketing practices in relation 
to professional investors, and its wider policy on third country access arrangements. 
Further, for both the AIFMD and UCITS, such a position could also involve the 
UK taking an accommodating view on its delegation mechanisms. More broadly, 
the UK could also seek to be a first mover and embrace the opportunity to do some 
things differently over the longer-term, particularly when new challenges emerge for 
the CIS sector.144 Certainly, given the impact fintech could have on the CIS sec-
tor, the UK adopting a innovative approach to the domestic CIS industry could help 
strengthen its competitive position. This would be not so much in relation to trying 
to directly compete with the EU but with respect to the world stage.145
6  Conclusion
One of the key issues arising from the UK’s divorce from the EU is the extent to 
which the UK should continue to shadow EU law.146 These tensions have been elu-
cidated upon in this paper using the case study of the CIS sector: on the one hand 
ensuring cross-border activity is not disrupted in the short to medium term via a 
preservation of current arrangements; versus the scope for change to offer some 
competitive advantage to the UK; whilst juggling the related risk this generates with 
respect to EU equivalence decisions.
With respect to CIS regulation, the paper argues that it would be prudent for 
the UK to retain sufficient alignment with EU law to provide sufficient certainty 
for businesses in the aftermath of Brexit. UK UCITS will either have to re-dom-
icile to the EU or be classified as alternative funds. Hence, the AIFMD third 
141 See e.g. Reynolds (2017); Ferran (2017).
142 Draft Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the Euro-
pean Union and the United Kingdom (2018), https ://www.gov.uk/gover nment /publi catio ns/withd rawal 
-agree ment-and-polit ical-decla ratio n (accessed 23 Aug 2019), section IV.
143 Ferran (2017).
144 House of Lords European Union Select Committee (2016).
145 Moloney (2017c).
146 Armstrong (2018).
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country rules take on even greater significance. Under the AIFMD, UK managers 
will need to comply with the AIFMD third country private placement regime, 
which is Member State specific. Further, retaining alignment with EU provisions 
will also be key for the UK to be regarded as sufficiently equivalent to be granted 
the AIFMD third country passport (if this is activated). The delegation route may 
provide some assistance to the UK CIS sector but this is by no means a universal 
cure.
The paper then considers the current EU initiatives in the CIS sector to examine 
where UK regulation could start to deviate and apply a more accommodating frame-
work, provided it remains in accordance with international standards. This could 
also be offered in an optional form for UK firms in order to offer maximum flex-
ibility for businesses. Of itself, this shows that a strategy of limited regulatory diver-
gence could start to materialise in particular areas, but that this may vary within 
industries as well as between them. Certainly, when this is considered at the level of 
the global arena, there could be further such spaces for the UK to be pro-active and 
drive future regulatory change. As evidenced within the example of CIS sector, in 
rapidly changing international environments, where fintech is emerging as a global 
phenomenon posing new opportunities and challenges, the UK should advance itself 
as a nation taking an international perspective to regulation, particularly where such 
issues have a global reach.
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